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INTRODUCTION
I am certain that everyone shares the interest of the National Trans-
portation Safety Board (NTSB) in reducing our accident investigation workload.
The NTSB is not, in the classical sense, a user of wind shear data. We have
no R&D capability, no simulators, and very little technical capability in our
organization to do in-depth analyses. However, even before the JAWS Project
began, we managed to develop some reasonably good wind shear models that have
been used to improve pilot training programs by using some of the accident
investigation data which came from flight recorders. Many people in the
industry have helped us with this considerably. We were very happy to see
the JAWS Project get under way so that we could improve upon that data base.
We certainly join the rest of the aviation community in our desire to ensure
that the data base is used to its maximum advantage to improve safety.
We are assured that wind shear has been around forever. However, we
really didn't focus in on the wind shear problem until the early 1970's,
although many accidents occurred before that time which were attributed to
thunderstorm penetration and other types of weather phenomena (just
different names for the wind shear environment). There may be a reason that
wind shear has received more attention since the early 1970's. I think that
with the advent of higher speed, higher wing-loaded aircraft, along with the
better instrument capability of both the airplane and ground navigational
aids, the chance of a wind shear encounter is much greater today than it was
several years ago. We have more planes flying into poor weather. They are
designed to do that; in addition, the airplane itself might be more critical
to the wind shear encounter.
NTSB has attributed wind shear as a cause or contributing factor in 15
accidents involving transport-category airplanes since 1970. Nine of these
were nonfatal; but the other six accounted for 440 lives. Five of the fatal
accidents and seven of the non-fatal accidents involved encounters with
convective downbursts or microbursts. Of other accidents, two which were
non-fatal were encounters with a frontal system shear, and one which was
fatal was the result of a terrain-induced wind shear.
The actions have stressed, first and foremost, the avoidance of wind
shear encounters; and, secondly, the actions needed to help a pilot get
through it if he encounters wind shear. I believe that one of the major
objectives of this workshop is to address how the JAWS data can be used
to develop models for the certification of aircraft systems and pilot train-
ing. We totally support these efforts, but feel that we must also address
the need to learn how to use the data obtained from JAWS to improve forecasting
and for develapment of real-time detection of the hazard threat. I think we
also need to address the fact that even if and when we get optimum airport in-
strumentation, such as terminal microwave Doppler radar, we have a lot of work
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to determine howto introduce the data provided from that system into the
pilot's decision-making loop. This is still a cause for very muchconcern.
Even more importantly, how can we more effectively use the LLWSAS?Canwe
use the JAWSdata to identify a hazards threat from the LLWSASso that it
can be communicatedin a meaningful way to the pilot?
I cannot ignore the fact that it has been nine years since Eastern 66
in NewYork; and nearly two years now since the Pan Amaccident in NewOrleans.
But today, given the samecircumstances, l'm not sure that the sameaccident
couldn't happen. Let's hope it doesn't. Keep in mind that despite the amount
of progress wecan claim during the last two years, I don't know that there
have been any real, firm actions that could have changed the situation as it
occurred in NewOrleans in July of 1982.
Wetotally support the use of the JAWSdata for developing practical
models of the microburst for system certification purposes and training. We
are aware, however, that more efforts need to be conducted to determine how
complex or sophisticated these models have to be. I agree with manypeople
who have indicated that they believe the FAAshould take the lead here, but
they need industry help. The FAAdoes have to stay very mucha part of these
efforts, and they must define the model so that everyone is working toward
the samegoal, at least in system certification.
At any rate, we already know the types of flight directors and autoflight
logic which need to be developed and implemented in order to optimize the air-
plane's performance in the case of a wind shear or microburst encounter. We
have had, for sometime, sufficient knowledgeof the general characteristics
of the downburst and outflow to identify how the logic of the current systems
needs to be changed. Even more importantly, we have to identify the systems
that are presently in use, and will remain in use for several years to come,
which do not incorporate the optimum logic in order to tell a pilot when he
might have to disregard what he has learned in the past in order totake some
rather strange evasive action. I know there are efforts under way to do this,
but l'm not sure they are quite as systematic as we would like to see.
That brings me to the training aspect. Wehave a lot of concern from the
point that I'm afraid we tend to place too muchemphasis on simulator models
in training. There is certainly a need to demonstrate to the pilot what happens
to his airplane whenencountering a microburst; but there is only so much time
in which to do this, and only so manyencounters can be demonstrated, and they
are not all the same. The condition of the encounter during the approach on
the ILS glidepath is not the sameas the encounter during departure or takeoff.
Oneencounter which interests mevery muchbecause it resulted in an accident
is the Allegheny DC-9 in Philadelphia, where the airplane actually encountered
the outflow of a microburst/downburst beyond the touchsown point along the
runway. It was located at the departure end of the runway which the aircraft
was approaching. In this particular case, the airplane was in trouble before
it ever reached the center of the disturbance. The airspeed built up as a
result of running into the outflow; the airspeed didn't bleed off, and the
airplane didn't land. The pilot saw that he was long and fast over a wet runway,
and he initiated a go-around which put him right in the middle of it.
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Wecertainly need reasonable fidelity in the simulations. For example,
we need to demonstrate what kind of control forces the pilot might be con-
fronted with then he takes someof these radical actions. This probably
reflects one of the biggest uses of the simulator. Wealso have to demonstrate
the need to rapidly add thrust if the pilot is in a position where he has
available thrust to add. Even though we get good academic models, we need
to augment the simulator work to actually teach the pilot the fundamentals of
what is happening to his airplane during wind shear encounters to prepare him
in any phase of flight.
I certainly hope that the large emphasison the microburst and its phenomenon
as a result of the JAWSProject does not lead us to ignore the frontal system
shear, which is probably not as dangerous from the significance of the winds,
but has caused accidents. The Iberia DC-IOaccident in Boston in 1972, although
non-fatal, could very easily have resulted in the loss of a wide-bodied airplane
full of people. Weneed to develop a syllabus which treats both the microburst
and the frontal system shear. Weneed to tell pilots how to recognize when
either condition might exist and how to avoid it. It is evident to us that
there is a need to eliminate bad information which is currently in the training
syllabus.
The NTSBis currently investigating two accidents. One is the Flying
Tigers DC-8which landed at Navy Norfolk in Octover of 1983; the other is the
SASDC-IO which landed at JFK in February 1984. It may not be possible to
point to wind shear as a primary cause of either of these accidents; however,
in both cases, the pilot was aware that the possibility of wind shear existed.
A wind shear did, in fact, exist in the SAScase, but the pilots apparently
misunderstood what they should have done for that type of wind shear. In
both cases, wind shear to the pilots meant, "Hey, I better add enough speed
to compensate in case I run into something on this approach." As it turned
out, they added speed but didn't bleed it off; in both cases, the airplanes
landed long and fast. In one case, it wason a flooded runway that resulted
in a hydroplaning aspect; in the other, there was just too little runway left
in which to stop.
In summary, I would like to note that someonehas to take the lead to
ensure the continuity of a systematic program to coordinate all the activities
being conducted on the wind shear problem. However, I feel that the FAAwill
need the continuing support and input from the R&Dorganization; i.e.,
academia, industry, and airframe and systems manufacturers. Furthermore,
many recommendationshave been madeby both the Safety Board and the National
Academy. It is important to note that after a National Academystudy is
completed and their report is released, that report remains on a bookshelf
with no one around to pull it off and relate what has happened. That is one
reason we are so encouraged by the formation of this ad hoc committee. Al-
though it may be beyond the scope of their charter, I believe it would be
well to consider keeping this committee intact to convene periodically to
discuss what actions are being taken to implement the Academyrecommendations,
and to exchange information relative to what is happening in industry.
I also feel that this ad hoc committee could be very useful in, perhaps,
communicating the needs to the carriers: i.e., to define the hazard threat;
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to determine the communication means to alert the pilot of a possible wind
shear condition (or a real-time detection of one), encouraging him to make a
decision to not penetrate it on that basis; to improve the on-board systems,
both the flight director and automatic flight control systems (and we cer-
tainly subscribe to the thought that an automatic flight control might be an
answer to the problem); and to continue to emphasize the improvement of train-
ing.
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